Operation Barbarossa

Operation Barbarossa was perhaps the boldest, most ambitious precisely at the same time most foolish and ill-timed operation penalize by national socialist Germ either(prenominal) during World War II. This operation committed Germany to fight a make upst the Soviet pith which it invaded on June 22, 1941 and terminated on March of 1942. In the early stages of the campaign, the Germans employed the same bilitzkrieg tactical manoeuvres that served them c bearly in the occidental campaigns.They were hoping to duplicate that same victory against the Soviets and were lulled into a fictitious sand of presumption when they covered a lot of acres and scored many victories which netted them lots of prisoners of fight. When 1942 came along, German high command began to realize later on how ill-use they were and thus began a protracted war in what they came to c solely the east lie. This operation was intended to be the fulfill custodyt of Hitlers vision of lebensraum (living space) in his work, Mein Kampf.If land was pronenessd in atomic fig 63, it could be obtained by and adult only if at the expense of Russia, and this meant that the forward-looking Reich must again set itself on the march along the road of the Teutonic Knights of old, to obtain by the German sword sod for the German plow and daily bread for the demesne Destiny itself seems to wish to point erupt the way to us present This colossal empire in the East is ripened for dissolution, and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia forget as well as be the end of Russia as a state. (cited in Shirer 124, 1044 Riasanovsky 515 Hitler)Politically, the clashing extremist ideologies of twain Germany and the Soviet amount gave the Nazis pull down much(prenominal) impetus to invade Russia, considering it as a new crusade against communism which they believed was the creation of the Jews for whom Hitler and the Nazis could see no good. Furthermore, Hitler envisioned the Slavic peo ple as a race that would serve the purpose of the Indo-European race by wither being their slaves or sport wherein they would win them with something to hunt or kill to maintain their virility (Hitler).This was an opportunity for the Nazis to exterminate these enemies in one fell swoop, once and for all. The Spanish civil war of 1936 gave the Germans a taste of war against the communist where they level off went locution to face against Soviet volunteers in this encounter (Riasanovsky 514-515). As Hitlers armies were annexing neighboring states as leave-taking of restoring Germanys glory and patrimony, Hitler began conducting diplomatic overtures as dissever of his strategy to keep capability adversaries at bay, eve for just a while and the Soviet colligation was one of them.Thus began cloak-and-dagger dipomatic maneuvers which resulted in the non-aggression contract amidst Germany and the Soviet Union prior to the encroachment of Poland where the latter was invited to take part in it. Furthermore, this pact served other purposes other than buying time for Germany to attack Russia. Strategically, Germany needed Russian territory to be able to transport resources to them following the blockade of the sealanes by the Allies, especially oil which was vital to Germanys war economy and machinery (Shirer 821-822).Despite entering into these agreements, secret or otherwise, both Germany and the Soviet Union still harbored suspicions and animosities against each other, primarily due to irreconcilable differences in ideology where both sides represent the antonym of political extremes, fascism and communism. The Soviets too saw the pact as an adhesiveness of lash-up on their part as they began their own expansion by assail the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as well as Finland, which was an ally of Germany in 1940.For the interest group of keeping the peace with the Soviets, the Germans remained silent as their minor ally was attacked b y the Soviets. Germany also matte insecure when the Soviets occupied the Baltic states which they also felt was theirs owing to historical precedence and point more concerned when the Soviets were also moving into Romania, a nonher German ally further heightening tensions amongst these two supposed allies but it was rather apparent that conflict between them would be inevitable as both sides were taking proceeds of each other, with the Soviets being the first (Riasanovsky 517 Shirer 832-836, 883).The Nazis entered into a treaty with the Soviets as an alliance of convenience hoping to get more from the treaty. As the war was progressing in the west, the Germans were setoff to realize how difficult the Russians were as negotiators as the latter were driving genuinely hard bargains, especially Stalin. It is revealed in captured German government documents that Stalin also took part in negotiations and was a very tough negotiator who could non be pushed into a compromise and alwa ys sought a better circularise for Russia and was very demanding.No amount of persuasion and even threats could deter the Russian despot (Shirer 882). The German war be after called for a one-front war in couch to conserve and husband their resources. Though most of western Europe was not occupied, Great Britain remained defiant and continued to make prisoner out in a protracted aerial battle over their transmission linespace where they were able to inspect heavy casualties on the German Luftwaffe (air force), thereby forestalling any plans for a seaborne invasion by the Germans well into 1941.By 1941, Hitler began to be acclaim impatient on how the campaign against the British was going. It also did not help that Germany was also miserable an acute shortage of resources and this was what prompted Hitler to jump the proverbial gun and attack Russia, persuasion also that the British would not give him a problem as he decided to shelve the invasion of Britain and leave it to h is U-Boats to strangle Britain economically.By celestial latitude of 1940, Hitler already had plans for the invasion from his generals and it was hoped that the attack would commence in the spring of 1941. The plan was code make outd Barbarossa, after the Holy Roman emperor who was one of the co-leaders of the Third tug an apt name for the operation since Hitler regarded this planned distasteful as a new crusade and it also came at a time when traffic between Berlin and Moscow were starting to turn sour as both sides appear to sense that they were double-crossing each other (Shirer 1045, 1049).Another reason for Hitlers desire to attack Russia the soonest was to seal Britains fate, leaving her with no ally when he said But if Russia is smashed, Britains last hope go out be shattered. so Germany will be master of Europe and the Balkans In view of these considerations, Russia must be liquidated The sooner Russia is smashed, the better. (cited in Shirer 1047) Furthermore, Hitler also said that When Barbarossa commences, the world wil hold its breath and make no comment. (cited in Shirer 1078) Hitler was apparently lulled into a false sense of confidence following the victories of German forces in Poland and western Europe and he felt they could do it again in Russia which make him even more confident because he regarded the Russians as inferior despite their large population and their inferiority would make it easy for Germany to defeat and conquer them. He was confident that he would succeed where Napoleon had failed, by conquering Russia pronto and in the shortest span of time possible.The rationale for this was to avoid the harsh Russian over overwinter which was one of the reasons why Napoleon failed and he would not need to make that same mistake Napoleon did. Furthermore, if the Russian campaign would guide on beyond winter, they also had to contend with the following spring where the snow-clad ground would turn muddy, which would play havoc on t heir positionful war machines which they had never encountered in the western front.He was so driven and obsessed in attacking Russia that he disregarded the advice of his commanders to commence campaigns elsewhere by eer stating Russia had to be eliminated first and that everything else could wait. The plan called for a vi-month time table but constant foot-dragging and waging campaigns in the Balkans and North Africa delayed plans well into June of 1941 (Shirer 1087-1088). Alongside the force planning, Hitler also spelled out his political plans for Russia once the invasion commenced in what became cognise as the Commissar Order. Hitler saw the war also as a battle of ideologies and he saw the need to eliminate those who propagate it when he stated The commissars are the bearers of ideologies directly opposed to National Socialism. Therefore the commissars will be liquidated. German soldiers guilty of breaking international law will be excused. Russia has not participated in the Hague Convention and therefore has no rights at a lower place it. (cited in Shirer 1089) It can further be inferred here that Hitler was intent on deliberately committing murder by ordering the systematic execution of any political commissar captured by German forces.Most of Hitlers commanders objected to it. These were professional soldiers who knew that murder was not part of a soldiers duty and this would be something they would have to deal with when some(prenominal) of them would be brought to trial in Nuremberg in 1945 (Shirer 1089-1090). In an apparent presentment of overconfidence, Alfred Rosenberg, one of Hitlers lieutenants, prematurely made a proposal on how to allot Russia into political administrations, each with an given German name.The Baltic region and Belarus would be called Ostland the Ukraine, along with its adjacent areas Southern Russia running along the Caucasus mountains would be called Kaukasus the areas contact Moscow, Moskau and Turkestan for the central regions, each ruled by the modern-day German adjustment of the ancient Roman prefect. Furthermore, plans were already in motion on how to stovepipe exploit Russias resources. They intend to use it to feed Germanys industries and its people.They were acutely aware of the unbecoming consequences it would have on the Russian people in terms of hungriness but the Nazis could not care less on what would happen even if one million million millions of Russians would perish on a lower floor their proposed policies (Shirwe 1091-1092). The forces Hitler arrayed against Russia was made up of 175 regular army divisions, supported by formidable artillery and armored divisions, both from the Wehrmacht (regular army) and his elect(ip) Waffen-SS. These were divided into three army groups, North, Center and South, each given limited objectives to capture.To the north, under the command of Field Marshal Wilhelmvon Leeb, the target was Leningrad. As the citys name implies, it was named after Lenin, the acknowledged father of the Russian Revolution which incidentally began in that city, then named Petrograd (St. Petersburg) and the Soviet Union and therefore, one of the symbolic targets of the German invasion forces. Historially, Hitler believed Leningrad was once part of the territory conquered by the Teutonic Knights of the Middle Ages and he was simply trying to take back what belonged to Germany by virtue of conquest (Salisbury 37).The center group, under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, would head for the capital Moscow, reminiscent of Napoleons actions. The southern forces under Field Marshal Gert von Rundstedt would head for capital of the Ukraine and Rostov-on-Don in what is now part of the Ukraine which was the Soviet Unions agricultural heartland as well as the road to the oil-rich scopes of the Caucasus and Black Sea area (Riasanovsky 518-519). Follow-on forces would come soon to do mop-up operations and to deal with any partisan or guerrilla activity i n the occupied areas.All in all, the Nazi governing had already made grandiose plans on what to do with Russia, believing they would at last succeed where Napoleon had failed in addition to the fact that Russias conquest would be the fulfillment of Hitlers visions defined in Mein Kampf. On the part of the Soviets, they had the numerical superiority over the Germans with roughly 8 million men to the Germanys 4 million which also included its allies from Italy, Hungary, Finland and Romania.They even had ten times the number of artillery, armored vehicles and aircraft arrayed against the Germans as well. In terms of numbers, the Soviets were by no means weak. If there was one weakness of the Red Army, it was its diversity with men from the various Soviet republics and whose dispositions ranged from cooperative to hostile towards one another even before they faced the Germans.Furthermore, majority of the Soviet forces initially arrayed were made up primarily of conscripts coming mainl y from the peasantry, a throwback of the tzarist era. The commissars were the ones who primarily kept them in line, not just to preserve ideologic purity but meting out discipline instead of the officers assigned to the units and even tried to lead them, replacing the ones persecuted even though they lacked the qualifications. Communications and lead was also poor.This was partly Stalins fault during the Great Purge of the 1930s where several equal senior officers of the Red Army were victims of the purges, depriving their units of capable leaders. As a result, these units were routed with millions killed and interpreted prisoner (Parker 60). Overall command was under Field Marshal Georgi Zhukov who had lordly himself in the far east in border clashes against the Japanese which gave him a reputation of being a successful commander.Countering the three German offensive groups are three Directions tasked with forming the defense of their assigned territory and launch a counteroffe nsive. They were the North-Western Direction under Colonel Generals Markian Popov and Fyodor Kuznetsov which covers the Baltic region the Western Direction under General Dimitry Pavlov which covers the areas west of Moscow and the South-Western Direction under Generals Mikhail Kirponos and Ivan Tyulenev concentrating on the Ukraine (Parker 107 Riasanovsky 518).Despite having more war machines compared to the Germans, they were inferior in quality. The Soviets initially had the T-28 medium tanks which could not brave up to the supeior armor the Germans prepared the Panzer I-III series. Although the Soviets had quality armor like the T-34 and KV-1, they were not abundant in number and were reserved for first-line units, particularly the elite Guards units.For air assets, once more, the quality of Soviet combat aircraft was inferior to ther Germans as they fielded the Poikarpov I-16, Lavochkin-3 and Mig-3 which were average compared to the superior Bf109 fighter planes of the Luftwaf fe which made short work of the Red business Force which were on peacetime status, with aircraft parked closely together in the airfields, qualification them easy targets for high-altitude bombers and the dreaded Stuka dive bombers of the Luftwaffe (Batty).On the political front, even Stalin was aware of an at hand(predicate) conflict with Germany and that the treaties they had would not last much longer as tensions between the two supposed allies were increasing as both sides began to sense the duplicity of the other. Yet, he refused to heed the warnings coming from intelligence agents in the field of an impending German attack and those who merely did their duty were branded as provocateurs and censured, if not arrested.He even ignored warnings from British and American emissaries who were aware of the dangers, thought it was a ruse to make him show his hand prematurely and not wanting to make the mistake Nicholas II did in 1914. Stalin held absolute power and did not permit a ny autonomy nor initiative among his subordinates (Salisbury 37). Although German aircraft hadalready been come in into Soviet airspace, Stalin gave orders not to meet or engage them.His hesitation proven costly as it sent a message to the Germans that the Soviets were complacent, making it the ripe time to attack. The first pattern of the war began with air strikes on disclose military bases and cities to sow terror, panic and confusion as well as cripple and hinder Soviet forces. By the end of the opening phase, the Lufwaffe enjoyed organic air superiority over Soviet territory, making them virtually unopposed as they managed to destroy a lot of Soviet aircraft on the ground and shoot down those that managed to take off but were inferior in quality.This was followed up by a simultaneous attack by all three German army groups in their respective fronts and they were able to shoe collar the Soviets off guard, resulting in numerous Soviet casualties and prisoners. They would dup licate the same tactic they did in Poland wherein they would bypass heavier enemy units and encircle them, cutting them off from any support and crush them. They would apply the same tactic as well on major Soviet cities, besieging them and starving their people although in the case of Leningrad, Hitler wanted it destroyed (Riasanovsky 518 Salisbury 40).Surprisingly, they were happily welcomed by the civilian population in the Ukraine and the Baltic states who hated Stalin and his communist regime. For them, the Germans were liberators instead of invaders and this had helped the Germans gain a foothold into Soviet territory (Batty). However, by the fourth week of the campaign, the progress bogged down as the German forces were overextended and needed time to bring home the bacon for support units to catch up. By the time they were able to resume again, winter had set in.Even though it provided mobility due to hardened ground, the conditions were do dismal and German forces were be ginning to understand now why Napoleon failed as impish blizzards wrought havoc on the invaders who were unprepared for General Winter, the same antagonist Napoleon faced and had proven to be a far more formidable foe than any army the Germans had fought. At the same time, cherubic Soviet troops from the east were deployed and they fought doggedly and with more determination, further slowness down the German advance.What had hoped to be finished in three to six months would run for four more years and would eventually bleed German resources dry. The Soviets may have been brought down initially but they were not out of the running as they managed to recover and become stronger in the latter phase of the campaign. In conclusion, Operation Barbarossa started off well but in the middle, it began to lose steam and thus forcing the Germans to fight a kind of war they did not want, especially against Russia which was a war of attrition.It was considered a failure because the Germans fai led to meet their objectives of capturing the observe cities and failed to meet their timetable, causing them to be caught up in a winter war they were ill-prepared for. This was attributed to the constant delay of the commencement of the attack. The delay caused them to be caught up by the winter season and Hitler refused to heed his generals advice for a pause to forego the winter to pass.Hitlers obsession for going on the offensive caused the German forces to be stretched too thin making the rear areas vulnerable to stay-behind forces and partisan attacks which secure down his forces. The dogged and tenacious resistance put up by the Soviets despite their inferior quality bought time for them to transfer their industries to the remote regions beyond the Urals where they were safe from attacks or capture and enabled the Soviets to reconstitute their forces. Finally, they underestimated the capabilities of the Red Army, especially the Nazi leadership who looked down on the Slavs .Finally, the Germans fought a war they did not want, a 3-front campaign Western Europe, North Africa and Mediterranean and the Eastern Front which mischievously divided their forces and resources, not to mention fighting multiple enemies, especially with the submission of the United States into the war. The Soviets too had their faults which nearly cost them the war, and Stalin was to blame for decimating his officer corps during the 1930 purges. His iron will of not permitting retreat also caused numerous casualties and prisoners as his commissars and loyal commanders blindly followed his orders.His saving grace was the leadership in the front provided by Zhukov who cleverly went around Stalins orders to husband his forces that enabled them to recover and regain anomic ground in the subsequent battles owing to the characteristic resilience of the Russian forces, interspersed with patriotic fervor. The Soviets ay have lost the initial battles but they eventually win the war beca use of this and eventually took the war to the Germans and visited upon them the same havoc they wrought upon them. plant Cited Barbarossa (June-December 1941). The World at War. Writ. Peter Batty. Thames. 1973.Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Hitler. Org. 1924. Retrieved 17 May 2010 . Parker, Robert Alexander Clarke. The instant World War A Short History. Oxford Oxford University Press, 2001. Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. A History of Russia. novel York Oxford University Press, 1984. Salisbury, Harrison E. The 900 Days The Siege of Leningrad. True Stories of World War II . Ed. Nancy J. Sparks. Pleasantville, rude(a) York The Readers Digest Association, Inc. , 1969. 35-63. Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York Simon and Schuster, 1960.